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The Arab Spring has represented a very 
complex process of change in different 
countries, all of them with diverse politi-
cal cultures and historical backgrounds. 
Thus, although it has been defined and 
“labeled” as a regional political move-
ment, each country in the MENA region 
should basically be analyzed separately. 
Of course, this does not preclude that 
many lessons can be learnt from diffe-
rent transition processes (if they actua-
lly take place) and therefore some ex-
periences can be useful for others. The 
case of Tunisia is particularly interesting 
in this sense. For several reasons (most 
of which have been pointed out in this 
text), Tunisia should be considered a 
leading country in the democratization 
of North Africa, including in the media 
sector. While countries like Egypt have 
also started a process of “liberalization” 
of the media sector (including the au-
diovisual sphere), in Tunisia this process 
has been undertaken by an adequate 
institutional system that has been able 
to enact a seminal and systematic le-
gislative regime. The Tunisian case is in 
many ways unique, as far as it is the 
result of a political will to establish a 
pluralistic and proportionate regulatory 
La Primavera Àrab està suposant un 
procés de canvi molt complex a diversos 
països, tots ells amb cultures polítiques i 
contextos històrics diferents. Per això, tot 
i que ha estat definida i etiquetada com 
un moviment polític regional, cada un dels 
països englobats a la regió MENA ha de 
ser directament analitzat de manera in-
dependent. Evidentment, això no descarta 
aprendre les lliçons que se’n deriven dels 
diferents processos de transició (si realment 
segueixen el seu curs), perquè determina-
des experiències poden resultar profitoses 
per a d’altres. En aquest sentit, l’exemple 
de Tunísia és particularment interessant. 
Per diverses raons (moltes de les quals són 
destacades en aquest text), Tunísia ha de 
ser considerat com el país líder en la demo-
cratització del nord d’Àfrica, incloent-t’hi el 
sector dels mitjans de comunicació. Men-
tre països com Egipte han començat un 
procés de “liberalització” d’aquest sector 
(on s’inclou l’àmbit audiovisual), a Tunísia 
el procés ha estat escomès mitjançant un 
marc institucional pertinent que ha permès 
posar en pràctica un règim legislatiu siste-
màtic i vertebrador. D’aquesta manera, el 
cas tunisià resulta excepcional en molts as-
pectes, en tant que és el resultat de la vo-
luntat política d’establir un sistema regu-
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IntroductIon. democratIc revolutIon and the      
process of polItIcal and InstItutIonal change
The revolution and political change initiated in Tunisia on January 14, 2011 with the flight of the dictator Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled the country for more than two decades, signifies the starting point of a reform 
movement of historical reach and importance across the Arab world.
Despite continued problems and uncertainties with the process and pace of 
reform, in Tunisia and across the MENA region, it is undoubtable that Tunisia trig-
gered a process of upheaval and change that subsequently rocked the region. In 
Tunisia, a steady, promising democratic revolution is taking place in a relatively 
hopeful and peaceful social context.
Tunisia has great potential to fully meet the challenges of the transition to 
democracy: a highly educated population, few serious internal conflicts or di-
visions, social structures based on a strong middle class, relatively low levels of 
poverty for the region, a relatively high level of respect for certain determined 
rights (for example, the rights of women as a group), lack of territorial or political 
conflicts with neighboring countries, and a functioning economy sector with 
strong prospects in tourism, textiles and the automobile industry.2
In such an environment, Tunisia will require international support to carry out 
its reform process successfully. The country needs the collaboration of other states 
and international organizations, particularly those dedicated to cooperation with 
the Mediterranean region and the Arab world. Tunisia has already taken important 
steps to facilitate this process, adhering to crucial international human rights norms 
and demonstrating willingness to conform to all the international systems and struc-
tures which protect and defend such rights (for example, the International Criminal 
Court). There also needs to be cooperation at the level of non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and voluntary and charitable organizations specializing in this field.
It is important to emphasize that the analysis and conclusions in this article 
are specific to Tunisia’s particular situation and characteristics and it would be a 
system. This regime has to be enforced, 
in the case of the audiovisual sector, by 
a newly designed independent regula-
tory authority.
Key words: Arab Spring, free speech, re-
gulation, democratic transition.
lador plural i proporcional. Dins de l’àmbit 
audiovisual, aquest règim ha de ser aplicat 
a través d’una nova autoritat reguladora 
de caire independent.
Paraules clau: Primavera Àrab, llibertat
d’expressió, regulació, transició democràtica.
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mistake to apply them to North Africa or the Arab world more broadly. The coun-
tries in these regions are extremely diverse and cannot necessarily be assumed 
to be part of the “Arab Spring” movement. In some cases this is simply because 
the pace of change is almost imperceptible (for example, Algeria), and in others, 
such as Morocco, because a more mature political and institutional infrastruc-
ture relative to the region does not require the same kind of popular uprising 
to force change. The process of revolt and government response has played out 
very differently in Egypt, Libya and Syria, making an individual analysis of each 
country absolutely essential. 
Finally, it is important to note the role of political Islamism the process of 
political change. Most analysts of the Arab Spring phenomenon have empha-
sized the relatively minor and limited role initially played by Islamic parties or 
factions, although the exact role varies from country to country. The input of 
Islamic groups has been almost irrelevant in the case of Tunisian revolution. 
Their strategy has been to immerse themselves in the popular movement for 
change and try to make common cause with other groups, despite their differing 
ideology. However, the progressive adoption of democratic rules and the imple-
mentation of a multi-party political framework, together with their important 
pre-existent social role, have resulted in their increased influence.3
Two months after Ben Ali’s departure, on March 15, the government consti-
tuted the Haute Commission pour la réalisation des objectifs de la révolution, de la 
réforme politique et de la transition démocratique (HC). This organisation, which 
was called “revolutionary,” was created by merging pre-existing organisations; its 
main function was to reform the Tunisian state through a process of legislative 
change. In strictly legal terms, this refers to a legal-political transitional process, 
in which there is no clean break between the previous and the emerging legal 
systems. Instead, the preceding structures, judicial powers and legal and consti-
tutional framework will be used to carry out reforms that will lead to a new legal 
and constitutional framework.
The HC was made up of representatives of political parties, trade unions, so-
cial associations, citizens’ groups etc., although its everyday activities are carried 
out by civil servants and professionals considered by diverse sectors of society as 
out of touch with reality, bureaucratic, and still bogged down in the principles 
and methods of the old regime. 
This reform process did produce some relevant results, particularly in the field 
of media regulation. Some important rules in the field of access to information, 
political parties and election regime were approved during this period as well. 
Tunisia is the first country of the Arab Spring that has been able to organize plu-
ral, open and internationally-accepted legislative elections within a reasonable 
time. The process to nominate the President of the Assembly, the President of the 
Republic and the Prime Minister has created some political controversy and nego-
tiations have not been easy, but at this present time the new institutional scheme 
is operating normally. The judiciary still retains basically the same structure and 
composition as in the former regime, and reform in this area is urgently needed. 
Most significantly, a new Constitution still has to be drafted and approved by the 
new democratic Assembly. Thus, the process of institutional normalization is only 
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48 partially complete. However, despite some political and social turbulences, in just 
one year Tunisia has taken very significant steps towards modern democracy.
Going back to transitional HC’s role, it attempted to introduce changes into the 
Tunisian legal system before the approval of the new Constitution. A very delicate 
event should be outlined here with respect to the media. In May 2011, the techni-
cal sub-commission of the HC prepared a Project of Press Law intended to regulate 
this sector, and to create a Higher Information Commission—a supervisory autho-
rity apparently subject to political control. This project, which had been the object 
of critical analysis by a number of international NGOs,4 liberal political parties, 
journalism professionals and freedom activists, was not really far from the existing 
Códe de la Presse (Press Code), Law 75-82, passed in 1975, during the times of the 
dictatorship. As a result of the criticisms, especially by the professional journalism 
sector, the project was totally discarded a few weeks after it appeared in the public 
debate. The proposal was basically made by the abovementioned sub-commission 
with no external consultation or input, disseminated unexpectedly without the 
consent of the members of the HC itself, and, it seems, in a very preliminary form. 
In retrospect, this was an unfortunate and negative development that did not help 
to encourage citizens to trust the interim democratic institutions. 
After this experience, the HC undertook the preparation (basically from scratch) 
of a new proposal for a legal regulatory framework in the field of freedom of expres-
sion, press regulation and audiovisual media services regulation, including the crea-
tion of an audiovisual regulatory authority. The result of this work has now appeared 
in the official gazette of Tunisia, in the form of two major new laws regulating free 
speech and media issues in Tunisia, which recently entered into force: Decree 115 
of 2011 (Decree 115/2011), on the Press, Printing and Publishing, and Decree 116 
of 2011 (Decree 116/2011), on the Freedom of Audiovisual Communication and 
the Creation of a Supreme Independent Body of Audiovisual Communication, both 
dated on 2 November 2011. The process of drafting these decrees was more open, 
transparent and participative than the earlier experience; as a result, this new regula-
tory framework is far more reflective of the insights provided by civil society.
Another important new institutional body involved in communications re-
form has been the Instance nationale pour la réforme de l’information et la com-
munication (INRIC), set up at the end of February 2011 by the second provisio-
nal government by means of a Law Decree. The institution has only accepted 
a consultative role, and is not seeking any kind of administrative profile. The 
INRIC has been presided over by Kamel Laabidi, who, like other members of 
this institution, is an outstanding communication professional with democratic 
credentials. INRIC appears to be a less technical, less bureaucratic and more rea-
listic organization than the sub-commission of the HC, and less vulnerable to the 
influence of the previous regime’s thinking and operational modes. Members of 
INRIC have first-hand experience in the field of media and communications and 
a more transparent approach. According to the recitals of the two Decrees, both 
have been after consultation from INRIC. This is something to take into consi-
deration and to be outlined here, to the extent that a positive judgment coming 
from the INRIC is a very important factor for the legitimacy of such important 
norms among professionals, activists and the public generally. This means, as 
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well, that the projects have been discussed among people with different profes-
sional and political profiles, and that amendments may have been introduced 
during the process. Some of the direct participants in the drafting of the Decrees 
have stressed that local and international experts in the field of media law were 
consulted in order to guarantee a text aimed to be “revolutionary” in terms of 
“enshrining the highest level of freedom and democracy”.5
As I explained in my previous report, virtually the entirety of the Tunisian 
media prior to the revolution was connected, to a greater or lesser degree, to the 
previous regime. Being founded during the dictatorship and before the revolu-
tion, media groups were inevitably obliged to work out the best way to survive 
and “coexist” with the Ben Ali regime. Journalists had been suffering from an 
almost complete lack of freedom for decades, during nearly all their professional 
lives. In this context, a real risk exists that the finally liberated journalist opts to 
become an activist instead of a reporter, i.e., a neutral observer who reports on, 
rather than influences, current events. Concepts such as professionalism, objec-
tivity, rigor, adherence to professional norms and ethics, and the elaboration and 
assimilation of editorial rules based on professional criteria are completely new 
and still have not been fully understood and taken on by journalists. Thus, the 
first step in order to “normalize” such a profession within the framework of a 
modern and advanced democracy is for the legislator to establish the basic pillars 
of the exercise of freedom of expression and information.
As it has been explained, the two Decrees have been approved before a new 
Constitution has entered into force, and by an interim Government and executi-
ve power with no direct democratic legitimacy (although, in its composition and 
formation, it was intended to represent the most important political forces assu-
med to be present in the country). Of course, the best scenario would have been 
if the approval of a series of laws regulating freedom of expression, establishing 
a legal regime for the press and audiovisual media, and creating the regulatory 
authorities needed for the enforcement of these laws had taken place after the 
Constitution was passed, freedom of expression and information were correctly 
recognized and protected, and a legitimate government and parliament elected 
by citizens was already in place. However, it has to be outlined that the situation 
of journalists and the media panorama right after the jasmine revolution was ex-
tremely delicate, and urgent measures were needed. 
To sum up, in an effort to find the correct balance between providing imme-
diate solutions for urgent problems and guaranteeing pure and strict democratic 
legitimacy of certain basic norms, the interim government gave more stress to the 
first need. Of course, this does not preclude the eventual reform of such legislation 
by the new democratic powers (in particular, the elected Assembly), according to 
constitutional values and principles to be adopted in the immediate future. In 
other words, these pre-constitutional Decrees will have to fully conform to the 
wording of the future Constitution, which will prevail as a superior norm. Before 
describing the major trends of such new norms, it is worth to make a short referen-
ce to the role of new media outlets within the process of political change.
While the exact role of electronic media and social networking sites vis-à-vis 
social, economic and political factors in the revolutions in the MENA region 
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50 has been hotly debated, there is little doubt that new media been significant in 
providing a medium for the spread of revolution and political reform in Tunisia 
and across the region. 
This phenomenon began before the revolution and the fall of the Ben Ali ad-
ministration, particularly with the Wikileaks revelations on corruption that were 
freely accessible by the Tunisian population online. At that time, the police also 
detained various online activists, whose blogs and web pages alarmed the regime.
Tunisia’s young, urban, educated and Westernized population is a large factor 
in the equation.6 According to the latest reports, 18 percent of the population 
has a Facebook account,7 and the high percentage of young people in the general 
population facilitates and promotes the use of mobile phones and computers. To 
give a striking example, the impact of the young Tunisian street vendor who set 
himself on fire in October 2011, sparking the revolution, was hugely magnified 
by such new technologies
As a consequence, while it may be the case that the constraints still facing the 
conventional media (especially radio and television) will only allow for reform 
and the emergence of new voices in the medium term, ”new media” —inclu-
ding online networks, digital media, video, music and photo sharing in online 
communities, social networking, blogging, alternative online news outlets, and 
other emerging formats— will converge to provide an outlet for introducing new 
discourses into the public sphere.
Despite the possibilities, there is a certain amount of insecurity about the 
degree of liberty now enjoyed by digital media in Tunisia. Formally, there is no 
applicable law, even though it is clear that the digital media are still being contro-
lled by the same censorship techniques as during the dictatorship.; for example, 
there are reports of control over content by the military, and of political bodies 
trying to use the Agence Tunisienne d’Internet to restrict access to the internet. 
the new regulatIons on the press, prIntIng and 
publIshIng
Decree 115/2011 has 80 articles, divided into seven chapters: 1) General provi-
sions, 2) On intellectual, literary and artistic heritage, 3) On journalists and pe-
riodical newspapers, 4) On comments in the public streets, 5) Crimes committed 
through the press or any means of publication, 6) Prosecution and penalties, and 
7) Transitional provisions.
The Decree is basically aimed at regulating freedom of expression (and freedom 
of information) in the field of publications, artistic works, books and periodicals. It 
includes a complete and detailed legal regime on professional journalists and their 
rights, which outlines the requirements to become a professional journalist and 
to hold a national ID card; the rights of access to information and news, data and 
statistics; the protection of the sources of journalists; and the legal protection from 
physical or moral attacks on media professionals. The Decree establishes the con-
ditions for publishing national periodicals,8 including some requirements in terms 
of transparency, the protection of plurality, and the exercise of correction and 
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right of reply. A short section on posting publications and advertising campaigns 
in public places appears just before a long and complete regulation of criminal ac-
tivities related to the press and other publications, which includes the prosecution 
procedure and penalties and a complete system of “accumulative” liability.
Decree 115/2011 represents a clear improvement compared to the preexisting 
authoritarian legal regime. The most important caveat that should be expressed is 
the fact that it basically derives from the structure and the provisions of the autho-
ritarian “Code de la Presse,” modifying some of its provisions and eliminating the 
most restrictive. Thus, it basically should be seen as a provisional step to guarantee 
some degree of openness and pluralism in the public sphere, before the Constitu-
tion is finally approved. It is clear, at any rate, that with the existence of Decree 
115/2011, public debates about controversial political issues will be more democra-
tic and participative, and that citizens will be able to form their opinions in better 
conditions. At this time, however, a key and unknown factor will be, of course, the 
way in which this new law will be interpreted and applied by public authorities, 
especially the judiciary. As it has been pointed out, the judiciary is the only public 
power that basically remains the same, in terms of structure and components, as 
during the times of dictatorship. This situation raises many significant concerns.
the new regulatIons on the freedom of audIovIsual 
communIcatIon and the creatIon of an Independent 
regulatory authorIty In thIs fIeld
Decree 116/2011 has 52 articles, divided into five chapters and sections which 
basically deal with the nature, definition and composition of the audiovisual 
independent regulatory authority (AIRA), the competence and powers that are 
granted to such an institution, and its functioning and financial schemes. As 
such, the Decree is not a substantive norm that regulates material aspects related 
to the provision of audiovisual media services, such as licensing, content, public 
service broadcasting provisions and so on. Some indirect references can be found 
in the text of the Decree because the future AIRA will have to address such issues, 
but a general and comprehensive law on audiovisual media services remains ne-
cessary within the Tunisian legal landscape.
The most important aspect of Decree 116/2011 is the fact that it creates an AIRA 
in Tunisia. This entity, as it will be explained, is legally designed according to inter-
national standards and therefore places Tunisia at the forefront of MENA audiovi-
sual regulation. Regionally, the only other comparable institution is the Hauté Auto-
rité de la Communication Audiovisuelle of Morocco (HACA) which was created as an 
independent regulator as well, in 2002, and has performed a very important and 
interesting regulatory role inside and outside Morocco during the last ten years.9 
In the Moroccan case, the HACA has been able to exercise its competences in a re-
markably independent way, being thus able to escape from immediate and compe-
lling political pressures. This spirit of independence is particularly obvious if we take 
a look at the outcome of the different processes of licensing of radio and television 
stations in which HACA has assumed the main responsibility from the beginning 
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52 until the end. In the field of content regulation, even though this is a very delicate 
and controversial issue in a country like Morocco, the regulator has performed with 
relative flexibility and proportionality. Finally it should be noted that at this present 
time the “Moroccan example” is being followed by several African countries within 
the African Communication Regulation Authorities Network.
The creation of such national regulatory entities is an important signal of demo-
cratic change. If regulation of content, in order to protect public values and citizens’ 
rights, and performed by an appropriate independent entity, is accepted and unders-
tood by political forces, media professionals and citizens, this means that democracy 
is not only perceived as a formal principle, but as a day-by-day process that depends 
upon a pluralistic public sphere. In transition societies, the idea of content regula-
tion can be easily linked to very recent experiences of censorship (and this continues 
to be a debate in Spain, after almost 40 years of democracy). Thus, this is why this 
matter should be seen as a key factor for the consolidation of democracy and as a 
first step towards political maturity. In the case of Tunisia, the new audiovisual regu-
lator should gain its legitimacy, first of all, through legislation that clearly establishes 
its remit, its competences, and the safeguards that media outlets and professional 
journalists have vis-à-vis the authority during and after the decision-taking process. 
And it has to be outlined that this is the case of Decree 116/2011. 
Secondly, the new regulatory authority will succeed if it effectively becomes a 
fundamental piece that guarantees a plural and equilibrated access to the audiovi-
sual public sphere; an adequate protection of specific values and principles involved 
in the dissemination of audiovisual content (upholding human dignity, protecting 
minors, imposing certain limits in commercial advertising, guaranteeing political 
plurality especially during election times, etc.); and, more broadly, a real safeguard 
for public interest and rights of citizens in the field of audiovisual media. 
The Decree outlines the composition of the AIRA and the appointment of its 
members. According to Article 7, members are appointed by the President of the 
Republic, the President of the Assembly, the Judiciary, and the most representa-
tive organizations of journalists, audiovisual media companies and audiovisual 
media managers. It has to be noted that the idea of “representation” could be 
incompatible with the idea of independence. In other words, if a regulatory body 
is composed (entirely or partially) by representatives of different sectors who 
perform their duties to defend their own interests, it will be hard to conclude 
that decisions will be taken according to the law and the public interest (unless 
you are a fervent follower of “public choice” theories). However, in this case, 
although this idea of “representation” appears in the process of nomination of 
the members of the authority, the wording of the Decree is particularly clear in 
stating (in Article 8) that members of the board shall exercise their functions 
according to the principles of independence, neutrality and service to the public 
interest (represented by the law, of course). 
This being said, it would have been preferable if the Decree made a wider 
and stronger mention to the need that only prestigious professionals with solid 
experience in the field of audiovisual communication can become members of 
the board. However, it is worth noting that the Decree establishes a serious set of 
rules in terms of dedication and avoiding conflict of interest.
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general conclusIons
The two Decrees that have been analyzed in this paper probably represent the 
first serious legislative step towards democracy in Tunisia. 
The Tunisian revolution took place just one year ago and set the start of a 
transition process during which rules (from the Constitution to the smallest ordi-
nance) formally in force still have been those approved during the authoritarian 
times. Of course, this has been and still represents a difficult situation, because 
new democratic processes (the formation of new political parties, the opening 
of the public sphere, the celebration of plural elections to the Constitutional As-
sembly) have had to be undertaken on the basis of old-fashioned laws or with no 
appropriate laws at all.
Another delicate point in this transition process is related to institutional 
structures. The HC and INRIC (to take two major examples), as new “revolutio-
nary” new entities, have been playing an important role “outside” traditional and 
remaining Ministries and various administrative offices. In particular, the HC, as 
it has already been pointed out, is a complex entity that has been operating in 
the interim period following the revolution and before the new “ordinary” and 
democratic institutions have come into force. The HC has made important efforts 
in order to become an interim “representative” body, in which different new de-
mocratic tendencies have been able to find a space. Of course, many problems 
have arisen within such a fragile framework. As no democratic elections had oc-
curred at the time of the HC’s establishment, allegations of misrepresentation and 
threats of abandoning this climate of consensus have come from Islamist parties. 
In this same sense, civil society, activists and young democrats who directly par-
ticipated in the revolutionary events expressed frustration that things were not 
evolving as quickly and as clearly as they expected. Finally, an obvious lack of 
democratic civic culture has created a situation in which the HC has been basica-
lly focused on its important tasks ad intra, but has not taken into consideration 
important needs and principles in terms of public transparency and participation. 
It is worth remembering here the difficulties and mistakes that took place during 
the process of drafting Decree 115/2011, keeping in mind, however, that in the 
second phase a special effort in terms of consultation and participation was made.
Another important thing to keep in mind in institutional terms is that Tunisia 
probably still does not have an administrative and judiciary structure ready to 
apply new democratic laws and to perform according to non-authoritarian princi-
ples. The core of the executive power and public administration remains roughly 
the same. This is also the case of the judiciary, as already mentioned. All these 
elements represent a very important challenge for the immediate future in order 
to guarantee an effective transition to democracy.
The future new Constitution is also a key factor for democratic consolidation 
and, in particular, to guarantee an effective protection of freedom of expression 
and information. As it has already been said, an ideal and theoretically correct 
scenario would have been to have the Constitution approved first and only then, 
and following its main principles and directives, approve the rest of the legisla-
tion. In the text I have already tried to explain the need to confront this general 
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54 desideratum with the difficulties of real political processes, like the Tunisian one. 
At any rate, it will be interesting to follow the Constitutional discussion process, 
now just started, and to see to what extent the model established by the two 
Decrees (and in particular Decree 115/2011) really conforms to the text of that 
future norm.
Apart from this “Constitutional test,” the most important challenge will con-
sist of the application of the two Decrees in the immediate future. In the case of 
Decree 115/2011, as I have noted, some of its provisions can be interpreted and 
potentially used to impede or to put obstacles to a rapid and diverse growth of 
new media outlets. The restrictions imposed through the definition of “professio-
nal journalist” should be kept in mind as well. This being said, Decree 115/2011, 
if proportionally applied, also has great potential to promote important chan-
ges within the Tunisian public sphere by making possible the apparition of new 
private operators, independent from former political stakeholders and Ben Ali’s 
network of interests.
Decree 116/2011 is remarkable as well, to the extent that it helps prepares 
the terrain for a flexible, proportionate, pluralistic and democratic regulation of 
Tunisia’s audiovisual sector. Decree 116/2011 establishes the basic rules for the 
creation of an AIRA that, at least in the wording of the norm, conforms to best in-
ternational practice in this field: independence, accountability, professionalism, 
transparent and proportionate procedures, and a clear delimitation of its remit. 
The big challenge now ahead is to make these important legal words become 
reality. The new entity should be established with the new members appointed 
following the spirit and the values that have inspired the law. Political forces must 
be able to reach a consensus on this issue and not use this piece of the institutio-
nal system as an instrument for political domination or confrontation. Finally, it 
should be stressed, once again, the need for a complete “substantive” law on au-
diovisual media services in order to provide for the highest level of legal certainty, 
by establishing the rules to be applied by the AIRA.
The Arab Spring has represented a very complex process of change in different 
countries, all of them with diverse political cultures and historical backgrounds. 
Thus, although it has been defined and “labeled” as a regional political move-
ment, each country in the MENA region should basically be analyzed separately. 
Of course, this does not preclude that many lessons can be learnt from different 
transition processes (if they actually take place) and therefore some experiences 
can be useful for others. The case of Tunisia is particularly interesting in this sen-
se. For several reasons (most of which have been pointed out in this text), Tunisia 
should be considered a leading country in the democratization of North Africa, 
including in the media sector. While countries like Egypt have also started a pro-
cess of “liberalization” of the media sector (including the audiovisual sphere), 
in Tunisia this process has been undertaken by an adequate institutional system 
that has been able to enact a seminal and systematic legislative regime. Liberali-
zation and privatization of the communications sector is a process that has been 
taking place in the MENA region in recent years, and it is not fully dependent on 
democratization processes: we can see it in “non-revolutionary” countries like 
Morocco or even in authoritarian regimes like Algeria (where it seems that a new 
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audiovisual law to open up this market may be approved sometime in 2012). 
However, the Tunisian case, together with the Moroccan one, are in many ways 
unique, as far as they are the result of a political will to establish a pluralistic and 
proportionate regulatory system. This regime has to be enforced, in the case of the 
audiovisual sector, by a newly designed independent regulatory authority.
The Tunisian case may, of course, bring interesting lessons for Libya as well. 
However, the post-war Libyan communications landscape is closer to anarchy 
than to a competitive and open market. Institutions will have to be built from 
scratch, and a democratic culture will need to emerge in a basically tribal country. 
And the new future Constitution should be more than a general declaration of 
intentions. However, substantial efforts at the local, regional and international 
level will be devoted to improving the conditions of this country and this specific 
area of the world. Most citizens of North African countries feel more confident 
than ever of the potential for change; Western powers (in particular, European 
countries) have started to see these countries as something more relevant and 
respectable than their walled-frontier with Africa. Thus, it can be said that there 
are many reasons for hope.
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notes
1 This article summarizes and outlines the 
most relevant conclusions if several reports 
prepared by the author and commissioned by 
Internews, which can be found in its websi-
te: <http://www.internews.org/research-publi 
cations/new-tunisian-legislative-framework-
focus-press-and-audiovisual-media>.
2 See the article by Jordi Vaquer “Túnez tras 
la revolución”. El País, 15th February 2011. 
3 See the analysis by Toby Mendel of the 
Centre for Law and Democracy at http://
www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2010/07/11.04.Tunisia.Prs_.pdf .
4 See the analysis by Toby Mendel of the 
Centre for Law and Democracy at <http://
www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2010/07/11.04.Tunisia.Prs_.pdf>.
5 See the article by Mohamed Ridha Jena-
ya, published in arabic in the newspaper As 
Sabah on November 17, 2011. 
6 See the interesting article on this the-
me by Timothy Garton Ash published in The 
Guardian 19th January 2011 <http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/19/
tunisia-revolution-twitter-facebook>.
7 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commen-
tisfree/2011/jan/19/tunisia-revolution-twit-
ter-facebook>.
8 Defined in article 2 as “any periodical 
publication in whatever form issued under a 
single heading and within close or far time-
frames though irregularly published, provided 
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56 that the sequencing is scheduled for an unli-
mited period and that the issues will be suc-
cessive in numbering and publication dates. 
Periodicals referes particularly to daily, weekly 
and bi-monthly newspapers, magazines and 
written and image periodicals in addition to 
yearbooks”.
9 It should be kept in mind that HACA has 
chaired the Mediterranean Network of Regula-
tory Authorities during the years 2006-2007.
